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Abstract: Seeing one’s laptop to be missing, hearing silence and smelling fresh air; these are all 
examples of perceptual experiences of absences. In this paper I discuss an example of absence 
perception in the tactual sense modality, that of tactually perceiving a tooth to be absent in one’s 
mouth, following its extraction. Various features of the example challenge two recently-developed 
theories of absence perception: Farennikova’s memory-perception mismatch theory and Martin 
and Dockic’s meta-cognitive theory. I speculate that the mechanism underlying the experience is 
a body schema that has failed to update itself. 
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I - Introduction 
Consider the following scenario: 
Dentist You are at the dental surgery, undergoing a procedure to have a tooth removed. 
After the tooth’s extraction, and once the anaesthetic wears off, you run your 
tongue along your teeth and arrive at the gap where once a tooth was located. 
The gap is experienced as unnerving, and not merely on its initial probing. For 
several days after the extraction you feel acutely unsettled whenever your tongue 
finds its way to the seemingly anomalous gap. That gap is not merely perceived 
as an empty space between two objects, i.e. the teeth that mark the boundaries 
of the gap. Rather, it is tactually perceived as a location at which a tooth is now 
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missing. Something once experienced as present within your mouth is now 
experienced as lacking. 
Dentist is an example of a perceptual experience, in the tactual modality, of an object’s absence. 
It is a situation in which you have a tactual perception, via your tongue, of the absence in your 
mouth of an object that was once present: your tooth. The experience is properly perceptual, 
and not merely cognitive. You do not infer, after each probe, that the tooth is missing. You 
already knew that to be the case, having been awake during the procedure and having visually 
inspected the inside of your mouth, after the tooth’s extraction, via the dentist’s mirror. So the 
absence of the tooth is not something that you forgot and subsequently reconfirmed. Rather, on 
each haptic probe, in the days immediately following the procedure, you tactually re-experience 
the unnerving, slightly unsettling, absence of the now extracted tooth.  
I shall argue here that this seemingly unremarkable experience constitutes a counterexample to 
two recent accounts of absence perception: Anna Farennikova’s memory-perception mismatch 
model (sections II-IV) and Jean-Rémy Martin and Jérôme Dokic’s meta-cognitive theory (section 
V). I speculate that the psychological mechanism responsible for the experience is a body schema 
that has failed to update itself (section VI). 
It is worth contrasting the experience in Dentist with a closely related, albeit distinct experience. 
In the context of a discussion that concludes in favour of the existence of tactual sense-data, H.H. 
Price (1932) discusses cases in which absent objects are experienced as ‘lingering’ in the form of 
after-images.1 Some of his examples are tactual: after one has removed one’s hat, it may still feel 
present on one’s head. Relatedly, in the case of phantom appendages, a body part that is literally 
absent continues to phenomenally linger after its amputation. The idea that one’s extracted tooth 
is likewise an experiential ‘lingerer’ is a suggestive one and my positive account of the mechanism 
underlying the experience (see section VI) relies on the idea that the tooth is being represented 
as present by part of one’s psychology.  
Nonetheless, one should be careful not to think of the experience of objects as absent, and one 
should be careful not to think of Dentist in particular, as an experience of an object’s after-image. 
																																								 																				
1  I am grateful to one of the journal’s anonymous referees for drawing my attention to 
Price’s discussion and for highlighting to me the possible connection between after-images and 
experiences of absence. 
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For one, no argument for the existence of sense-data analogous to those one finds proceeding 
from considerations of after-images (see, e.g., O’Shaughnessy 2000: Ch.18) could proceed from 
cases of absence perception. After-images are appearances of objects, e.g., hats, lights, arms, etc. 
that linger in the absence of those objects. But perceptions of absence are not experiences of 
ghostly appearances or ‘half-presences’ akin to illusory experiences of pure visibilia like rainbows 
or shadows, as after-images are plausibly to be regarded (Phillips 2013). Feeling the absence of a 
tooth in one’s mouth is not to be analysed as feeling a sort of shadowy, half-present tooth (mere 
tactibilia, if there could be such a thing). It is an experience of a thing’s not being there at all.  
Before beginning, I outline my assumptions about the nature of absence perception and 
perception more generally. First, I assume that tactual perception has high-level content (Siegel 
2006) in that it represents not only low-level properties relating to spatial extent, texture, weight, 
etc., but also properties relating to the kind(s) under which tactually sensed objects falls under. 
For instance, running one’s fingers along a table, one tactually represents the presence of a table 
(or perhaps wood), in addition to tactually representing the presence of variegated grooves on a 
relatively flat surface before one. One doesn’t merely represent via touch that there is an object 
before one; touch takes a stand on the kind of object there. I assume that this carries over in 
cases of perceived absences, though matters here are delicate (see Farennikova 2013: 451-2). 
Thus, in Dentist and cases similar, one represents the absence of a tooth. Those who disagree 
can understand the content of one’s tactual experience in Dentist along such lines as: that an 
object is absent. In making these assumptions, I also assume that perception does have content 
in that it represents the world as being some way. Tied up with the concept of representation is 
misrepresentation, since representations have accuracy conditions. Certainly, not everyone 
agrees that we should think of perception in this way (see Campbell 2002; Martin 2004 and 
Travis 2004), but insofar as I must adopt some standpoint from which to investigate absence 
perception, the representationalist one is my choice. Many assume that questions about 
perception easily translate between representationalist and non-representationalist frameworks. 
I make no such assumptions here (see Cavedon-Taylor 2015 for discussion). My final 
assumption concerns the scope of absence perception. Perceptual content has both an object-
place and a property-place. In hallucination, the accuracy conditions of the object-place are not 
met. In illusion, the accuracy conditions of the object-place are met, while those of the property-
place are not. Accordingly, one can have perceptions of absences that are about the absence of 
certain properties and one can have perceptions of absences that are about the absence of certain 
objects. As should be clear from the above, my concern is with the latter.  
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II – The Memory-Perception Mismatch Theory 
Perceptual experiences of absence, like Dentist, occur in non-tactual modalities. Consider the 
following example:  
Laptop You are working in your office, engrossed in writing a philosophy paper. You 
are called away to a meeting, in which you dutifully sit, itching to return to your 
work. The meeting ends and you make a beeline back to your office. You open 
the door, only to see your laptop is gone! 
Taking cases like Laptop as central examples of absence perception, Farennikova (2013; 2015) 
makes a number of claims about the nature of such experiences. These claims are offered as 
non-modality-specific ones, and so are intended to provide a unified account of absence 
perception across the senses. The non-visual cases Farennikova mentions include: 
• Hearing a lover’s absence by hearing her footsteps grow quieter as she exits the building. 
• Tasting the absence of chlorine in water. 
• Smelling the absence of exhaust in the air. 
• The sensation of missing a step while going down the stairs. 
First, Farennikova (2013: 445) claims that the phenomenology of absence perception is one of 
incongruity. This rings true in both Laptop and Dentist. The perception of the laptop’s absence 
and the perception of the tooth’s absence both have a phenomenological ‘oddness’ to them. The 
experiences have a conscious character which might be described as one of strangeness, 
unfamiliarity and which are somewhat unsettling. 
Second, Farennikova claims that the mechanism underlying absence perception is one of 
mismatch between images of objects (‘object-templates’) on the one hand and visual stimulus on 
the other. These object-templates are tokened in working-memory by the visual registering of 
contextual, environmental cues. These templates encode, sometimes only coarsely, the visible 
properties of objects. Once tokened, the template is ‘projected’ in order to be matched against 
further incoming perceptual stimuli. This projecting is described as “a process of holding up the 
template of a searched object for the purpose of comparison of its perceptual attributes with the 
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attributes of the perceived scene.” (Ibid: 441) If there is a mismatch, i.e. the projected template 
of O fails to refer to any perceived object in the scene, the result is that O is experienced as 
absent. As Farennikova puts it: 
Visual experience of O’s absence consists in an object-level mismatch between O’s 
template generated by visual working memory and a percept of the observed stimulus. 
If we couch this proposal in tactual terms, then we get the following:  
Tactual experience of O’s absence consists in an object-level mismatch between O’s 
template generated by tactual working memory and a percept of the observed stimulus. 
Such a model describes an “expectational mechanism.” (Ibid: 440) You expected the presence 
of the laptop. What you saw was an empty desk. A perceptual experience of the laptop’s absence 
ensued.  
At this point, one might be tempted to think that the problem posed by Dentist is the following: 
when you first probed the inside of your mouth, after the extraction, you did not expect the tooth 
to be present. You believed the dentist to have removed the tooth. You looked in the mirror at 
the inside of your mouth, and actually saw the gap between the molars previously adjacent to the 
offending, now extracted, tooth. Moments later, when your tongue found its way to the gap, you 
did not think you would touch it again (that would have been unexpected). So it isn’t that you 
expected to find the tooth to be present and were then surprised to find it absent. Moreover, it 
wasn’t as if you had no expectations about the tooth’s presence or absence. You did have 
expectations: you expected the tooth’s absence and that is indeed what you found. So one might 
conclude that Farennikova’s model simply does not apply in the case of Dentist, since there is 
no mismatch here between working-memory and occurrent tactual stimulus. There is, contrary 
to that model, a match. Still, we have the perception of an object’s absence. Ergo, Farennikova’s 
model falters in explaining Dentist. So we have a counterexample.  
The above objection rests on a potential misunderstanding of Farennikova’s model. The 
misunderstanding lies in thinking that the expectational mechanism described is a personal-level 
one, when it is, rather, advertised as a sub-personal one (Ibid: 440-4). For that reason, it seems 
that what one consciously expects or anticipates matters not, as far as the mechanism is 
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concerned. Indeed, Farennikova is explicit that object-templates “may be projected 
involuntarily.” (Ibid: 442-3)  
Still, the above line of objection cannot be said to miss the mark entirely. After all, there is a 
striking difference between Laptop and Dentist that needs explaining: how does the tooth-
template get tokened in working-memory, given that, unlike in Laptop, there is no personal-level 
expectation of the object’s presence? Indeed, although the mismatch model is advertised as 
involving sub-personal expectations, some of the examples of absence perception Farennikova 
discusses seem to imply the presence of personal-level expectations: 
You are about to make coffee and discover that the coffee jar is empty; or you expect an 
important document in the mail but there is nothing in your mailbox; or you make a trip 
to a bakery only to see that your favorite desert is missing from the display. These 
situations, in essence, are failed visual searches: you begin to look for an object, expecting 
it to be at a certain place, and see its absence when your expectation is disconfirmed. 
(Ibid: 440) 
A very natural thought is that these are cases in which an agent consciously expects the presence 
of coffee, a particular document, a particular desert, etc. Thus, these examples plausibly depend 
upon the agent’s having a personal-level expectation of an object’s presence, one that is missing 
in the case of Dentist. Dentist would remain a counterexample that falls outside the scope of 
Farennikova’s model. 
Indeed, there is a further difficulty here for Farennikova, which is how the expectational 
mechanism can be sub-personal even in the case of Laptop. Farennikova claims that Laptop is a 
case of visual search:  
 
When we expect something, we represent what is possible or likely in the environment. 
This advance information is coded as conditional on contextual cues. For instance, seeing 
a kitchen will cause you to expect to see a fridge and an oven. (Ibid: 440-1) 
 
But if Laptop were a matter of conditional or contextual cues, then seeing any work-desk, in any 
office, should likewise occasion the perception of a laptop’s absence. It wouldn’t matter that one 
consciously expected the laptop’s presence, one would have seen the laptop to be missing, 
irrespective of one’s memory of it being located on the desk. If that is so, then there is an 
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ambiguity in Farennikova’s account over whether the expectations adverted to are personal or 
sub-personal. Moreover, this ambiguity forces the following dilemma: if the expectations are sub-
personal, then while Dentist would pose little trouble, Laptop would seem to go unexplained. 
But if the expectations are personal-level, then they are missing in the case of Dentist, yet it is a 
case of a perceptual experience of absence. 
 
III – Deviant Patterns 
Farennikova’s model has a great deal of flexibility. There are a number of ways it might be 
adapted to explain Dentist. Indeed, it is instructive to consider another example of absence 
perception in the visual modality, relatively similar to Dentist, and which Farennikova believes 
the mismatch model to explain: seeing the absence of a photograph when one reaches a gap in 
a series. On the face of it, this is similar to tactually experiencing the absence of the tooth, since 
the latter may be thought to involve running one’s tongue along one’s teeth before arriving at the 
experientially salient gap. On this account, both Dentist and seeing the absence of a photograph 
are experiences of what Farennikova calls ‘deviant patterns’: environmental regularities perceived 
at t1 cue tokens of relevant object-templates in working-memory which then fail to match any 
stimuli perceived at t2. For instance, as one visually experiences the photographs on the wall, a 
photograph-template is generated in working memory, as that is what is likely to come next. But 
when one arrives at the gap in the series, the template fails to match the incoming perceptual 
stimulus. What one ends up visually experiencing is not merely the presence of wall-space 
between two photographs; rather, one sees a photograph’s absence. Similarly, Dentist might be 
explained by tactually experiencing a pattern of teeth, via one’s tongue, and this likewise 
generating in working-memory an object-template of a tooth which then fails to match the 
stimulus encountered upon reaching the gap. If that is right, then Dentist is explained by the 
memory-perception mismatch model after all, and in such a way that treats the anticipatory 
mechanism at its core as automatic and sub-personal. 
The difficulty is that there is no reason to think that the experience in Dentist depends upon 
moving one’s tongue along the actually present teeth in this way. Granted, Dentist can be 
described in such a way that it is a case of perceiving a deviant pattern. But it would be dogmatic 
to insist upon this description since one may tactually perceive the tooth’s absence in a number 
of ways that do not involve such patterns. First, one may simply press one’s tongue directly onto 
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the teeth adjacent to the gap. Alternatively, one may haptically probe the empty space itself. In 
the first situation, nothing resembling a pattern of stimulation enters the picture; there are simply 
two points of contact on the tongue, some small distance apart. In the second case, there is 
variation in stimulation as one actively explores the empty space, making contact with the two 
spatially separated teeth either side. But experiencing this variation in stimulation is nothing like 
seeing a line of photographs and suddenly coming to a deviant gap. It is more like staring at 
empty wall-space between two photographs and varying how one distributes one’s attention 
between the two picture-frames. 
 
IV – Expected Absences 
I suggested above that one of the difficulties Dentist poses for Farennikova’s model is that it is a 
case of experiencing an expected absence, and so seems to involve a fact of match between 
memorial expectation (i.e. the object-template) and perceptual stimulation. Crucially, however, 
Farennikova recognises that not all cases of absence perception are like Laptop in involving 
unexpected absences. Indeed, Farennikova claims the model allows for a disassociation between 
memory-perception mismatches and ‘sensory surprises’ (Ibid: 447), thereby allowing for 
experiences of absence that are expected. This is because what is central to the model is a contrast 
between the object-template in working memory and incoming perceptual stimuli: 
[I]t is possible to see absences without any failure of expectation. Tourists traveling to a 
desert will expect to see no trees there. An observer will expect the sun to disappear 
behind the ocean line. Their expectations about absences… are accurate and upon 
confirmation will result in experiences of absence. (Ibid: 446) 
It is not very obvious that these cases do constitute perceptual experiences of absences rather 
than inferrals of absences. But we can still test whether the model can be applied to Dentist. The 
idea would be that a perceptual experience of the tooth’s absence occurs because, appearances 
to the contrary, there is a tooth-template in working-memory being matched against the tactually 
experienced gap. The explanation for why the template is tokened would be that, in line with 
Farennikova’s theory, templates signal not only what objects one expects to be present but also 
what objects one expects to be absent (Ibid: 446). In Dentist, you expect the tooth to be absent, 
and this, no less than an expectation of its presence, tokens the relevant tooth-template in working 
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memory. Indeed, on this view, the expected absence would be confirmed via the projecting of 
the template against incoming tactual stimulation of the gap between two teeth.  
The potential problems with this explanation are threefold. First, it is not clear why one should 
think that expecting O to be absent in a scene involves the tokening of an object-template in 
memory, rather than the tokening of the belief that O is likely to be absent in that scene. Consider 
now the process of confirming that O really is absent. Need object-templates in memory be a 
necessary factor here? Farennikova claims so, though it is not obvious what supports this 
conjecture: 
Suppose you learn that your colleague will not be attending the faculty meeting today, 
and so you come to expect her absence. You walk into the meeting room, and as you 
expected, she is not there. How do you confirm her absence? Presumably, you go 
through the same process of projection and mismatching. (Ibid: 447) 
In Dentist you believe your tooth to be absent, having both testimonial and visual evidence of its 
removal. Why can’t this belief simply be confirmed by inferences drawn from introspection of 
one’s tongue-movements receiving no resistance at a particular spatial location?  
Second, Farennikova’s examples of expected absences, e.g., the experiences of the tourists and 
your experience of your absent colleague, do not seem to involve the phenomenology of 
incongruity. You expect your colleague to be absent from the meeting. Suppose you confirm that 
by sight and/or inferences from sight. Nothing feels amiss or anomalous in such a situation: what 
you see is what you expected. But this makes Farennikova’s cases of expected absences entirely 
unlike those of unexpected absences like Laptop. This forces another dilemma for the memory-
perception mismatch theory. The first horn: if the model can explain perceptual experiences of 
expected absences, as it is advertised to, then Farennikova is wrong about incongruity constituting 
the phenomenology of absence perception. Straightforwardly, the expected absences 
Farennikova discusses do not involve such a phenomenology. On the other horn: if 
Farennikova’s model cannot explain perceptions of expected absences, then the model suffers 
counterexamples. 
Third, and very much related to this last point, Dentist is a case of an expected absence that does 
involve the phenomenology of incongruity. This sets it apart from other examples of expected 
absences and makes it more like Laptop. Still, insofar as Dentist is a case of an expected absence 
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it is unlike Laptop and more like the examples involving the tourists and your colleague. The 
problem is that one cannot explain all these cases in the same way: any account of the mechanism 
underlying experiences of expected absences, where those experiences lack the phenomenology 
of incongruity (e.g., seeing your colleague’s absence), will ipso facto fail to account for expected 
absences that, like Dentist, do involve the phenomenology of incongruity.  
But there is an alternative theory that concludes it is a mistake to think that the experience in 
Dentist is really perceptual at all: Martin and Dokic’s (2013) ‘meta-cognitive’ account.  
 
V – The Meta-Cognitive Theory 
An alternative to the memory-perception mismatch model is the meta-cognitive theory. On this 
theory, developed by Martin and Dokic (2013), experiences of seeing one’s laptop to be missing 
and feeling one’s tooth to be absent are not really perceptual. Instead, they are properly described 
as ‘meta-cognitive’: any unusual phenomenology in such cases is nothing more than the feeling 
of surprise; in that respect, alleged cases of absence perception fail to involve a specifically 
‘perceptual’ phenomenology of absence. 
Martin and Dokic’s argument for their conclusion involves reflection on a contrast case. In case 
1, you are presented with 15 boxes. Upon opening them, you find a single red marble in each, 
at least for the first 10 boxes. Upon opening the 11th, you reveal a green marble. Case 2 is exactly 
the same, except box 11 has no marble. Martin and Dokic claim that a feeling of surprise is 
common to both cases, but that Farennikova must claim case 2 involves something further: a 
perceptual experience of the absence of a red marble. However, Martin and Dokic then argue 
that if we subtract from both cases one’s surprise at not finding a red marble, there is nothing 
further to explain. There are only perceived presences of a green marble (in case 1) and the 
inside of a box (in case 2). If Martin and Dokic’s theory is correct, we can explain all we need to 
explain about so-called ‘absence perceptions’ by simply talking about perceived presences and 
the meta-cognitive feeling of surprise. 
But perceived presences, coupled with the feeling of surprise, cannot explain all that we need to 
explain about absence experiences. In particular, they cannot explain Dentist. For while surprise 
may be a factor in many cases of absence perception, it is not a factor that occurs in Dentist. 
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Given that one expects the tooth’s absence, what would be surprising would be for one to tactually 
experience the tooth’s presence. Finding the tooth’s absence is just what one expects. So, one is 
not surprised to then find the tooth absent. That is to say, what makes Dentist resistant to the 
meta-cognitive analysis is that, once again, it is an expected absence. This sets Dentist apart from 
seeing one’s laptop, or a photograph, to be missing. Returning to the photography exhibit a 
second, or third, time, say, one now expects to see a gap between two photographs; it is plausible 
that one will no longer have an experience of a photograph’s being absent and this will likely be 
matched by failing to feel surprised: one sees what one expects—the photograph isn’t there. Ditto 
for experiencing the laptop’s absence. But the experience in Dentist differs from both these. It 
occurs in the absence of any feeling of surprise. So, contrary to the meta-cognitive theory, the 
phenomenology of surprise is not central to any analysis of absence perception. Accordingly, the 
phenomenology of surprise ought to be kept distinct from the phenomenology of incongruity or 
anomalousness. Martin and Dokic blur this distinction, analysing the phenomenology of 
incongruity as surprise. But there is more nuance to incongruity than surprise. Dentist illustrates 
as much.  
The meta-cognitive theorist may reply that they need not commit to a single analysis of all putative 
cases of absence perception: surprise is the correct analysis of some examples of absence 
perception, but different meta-cognitive feelings may need to be appealed to in order to explain 
others. The most obvious way to apply this strategy to Dentist would be to claim that all one 
needs to appeal to here is the perception of presences, i.e. the teeth still in one’s mouth, plus a 
feeling of incongruity. This strategy mirrors what Martin and Dokic have to say about perceiving 
the empty box in case 2: one sees what is present, i.e. the inside of the box, and feels surprised.  
The difficulty with this proposal is that it seems insufficient to capture the phenomenology of 
Dentist. For that phenomenology is not adequately captured by appealing to perceived 
presences, plus a feeling of incongruity. After all, it is not that what are perceived as present, the 
remaining teeth, are experienced as incongruous. Note the contrast with Martin and Dokic’s case 
2: plausibly, what is perceived as present there, the inside of the box, is genuinely surprising, 
given that all the other boxes were seen to contain marbles. But nothing that is perceived as 
present in Dentist is incongruous or anomalous. What is incongruous or anomalous is what is 
absent! Once one acknowledges this, it is difficult to refrain from taking the further step of 
affirming that the phenomenology in Dentist is perceptual, insofar as it is directed towards the 
gap. Given that one already believes there to be a gap there, such a phenomenology is not happily 
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analysed as an instance of purely cognitive phenomenology either. The most natural explanation 
is that it is perceptual phenomenology. One has a tactual experience of a tooth’s absence.  
 
VI – The Phantom Tooth 
All in all, we have reason to think that Dentist is a genuinely perceptual experience of an absence, 
contra Martin and Dokic, but one that fails to be explained by a memory-perception mismatch 
mechanism. What psychological mechanism does underlie Dentist? My speculative answer is 
that it involves a mismatch between body schema and incoming perceptual stimulation. In short, 
after the removal of the tooth, one’s body schema fails to update itself. The result is that it 
continues to represent the tooth as present. When one moves one’s tongue in one’s mouth, one 
then has a tactual experience of the interior of one’s mouth that conflicts with how it is 
represented by one’s body schema; that is, as continuing to contain the extracted tooth. An 
unsettling tactual experience of the tooth’s absence ensues.2 
This account agrees with Farennikova’s model insofar as it affirms that mismatching of 
representational content is the right way to account for Dentist. Given that the phenomenology 
of incongruity is present here, we have reason to think that a mismatch occurs somewhere in our 
psychology. But what makes Dentist unique among the examples of absence perception 
discussed here is that it is an example of experiencing the absence of one’s own body part. (This, 
in part, is what makes the experience so acutely unnerving.) Taken together, these considerations 
strongly suggest that the mismatch at issue is between one’s body schema, not working-memory, 
and tactual awareness of the inside of one’s mouth.3 
																																								 																				
2  See Turker, et. al. (2005) for experimental evidence that the body schema encodes 
teeth. Moreover, those who argue for the possibility of incorporating extra-bodily tools into the 
body schema sometimes model such incorporation on the body’s representation of teeth 
(Holmes and Spence 2006). 
3  Of course, there might be other cases of perceiving the absence of one’s own body part 
that are explained by Farennikova’s model. One might see the absence of one’s middle finger, 
following its amputation, say. Such an experience is plausibly explained by the perception of a 
deviant pattern, whereas Dentist need not be. 
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One might wonder whether this proposal is compatible with Farennikova’s model along the 
following lines:4 perhaps movement of the tongue in the direction of the missing tooth cues an 
object-template of the tooth in working-memory precisely in virtue of the body schema having 
failed to update itself. On this revised proposal, bodily movement triggers the tooth-template due 
to the body schema’s continuing to represent the presence of the tooth.  
By way of replying to this revised proposal, it will be helpful to reflect on differences between 
representation by working-memory versus representation by the body schema. This will also 
serve to further highlight important differences between Dentist and Laptop. 
A key difference between body schema representation and working-memory representation is 
that the latter tends to update itself much faster than the former in response to incoming stimuli. 
(It is well-known that the body schema is relatively stable and can take significant time to update, 
resulting in experiences of so-called ‘phantom’ appendages.) Indeed, Farennikova claims that 
visual experience of the laptop’s absence is fleeting and short-lived (Ibid: 445 n.12); it quickly 
dissipates into either a perceptual experience of the incoming stimulus (the presence of the desk) 
or collapses into visual imagery of the object-template (one’s laptop). But as well as quickly 
dissipating, the experience in Laptop is unlikely to repeat itself; working-memory speedily 
updates how it represents the room in response to the incoming stimulus in such a way that one 
is not continually struck by the laptop’s absence as one re-enters the room minutes, hours or 
days later. But this makes for a contrast with Dentist. First, the experience in Dentist is not fleeting 
and may be unsettling precisely because of its duration; one can experience the absence of the 
tooth for some time, as one haptically probes the void left by its extraction. Second, a few 
minutes, hours, mornings, etc., after the tooth’s removal, one may continue to re-experience the 
tooth’s absence in a way that one doesn’t continue to re-experience the laptop’s absence. Thus, 
considerations of duration and repeatability suggest that working-memory has little role to play 
in facilitating the tactual experience of absence in Dentist, whether in the way Farennikova’s 
model suggests, or in the manner suggested by the revised view outlined above. 
At the beginning of the paper, I attempted to distinguish experiences of after-images from 
experiences of absences. Phantom appendages, I mentioned, were thought of by Price (1932) to 
																																								 																				
4  I am grateful to one of the journal’s anonymous referees for prompting me to think 
about this matter.  
	
14 of 11 
be examples of the former. Yet hasn’t what I have said here now blurred the line between the 
two? Experiences of phantom appendages are typically thought to be brought about in virtue of 
a body schema that has failed to match the actual organisation of one’s body. But I have similarly 
relied upon this mechanism to explain the experience of absence in Dentist. How can these 
claims be maintained without tension?   
The answer is that Dentist does not rely merely on a body schema that has failed to update itself. 
Rather, it relies on a mismatch between that body schema and tactual stimulation.5 Indeed, it is 
possible that subjects suffering with phantom appendages might undergo an experience similar 
to that in Dentist, if they haptically explore the space where they feel the phantom limb to be 
located. Still, assuming such a thing is possible, it would be the mismatch in tactual stimulation 
and body schema that would underlie this experience of the limb’s absence. Crucially, it would 
not be a haptic sensing of a tactual after-image. So the two remain distinct.  
 
VII - Conclusion 
There is greater variety among our experiences of absence than is captured by the memory-
perception mismatch and meta-cognitive theories. Attempting to unify phenomena by explaining 
them with a single model is a worthwhile endeavor, but by shoehorning too many cases into a 
single mold we risk overlooking genuine diversity. This, in turn, risks us missing out on a full and 
enriched understanding of the target explanandum, i.e. absence perception, and the myriad of 
mechanisms in the brain that might underlie it.  
																																								 																				
5  Another anonymous referee for this journal asks whether my view entails that a brain in 
a vat could have an experience of absence. My answer is ‘yes.’ One might find this result odd. 
For a brain in a vat, all objects are absent. So in having an absence experience, do I (and others 
in the debate) commit to brains in vats as having veridical experiences? Again, my answer is 
‘yes.’ But this result is not so odd if one keeps matters of perceptual veridicality distinct from 
matters of perceptual contact with one’s environment. On my view, the absence experiences of 
the brain in the vat are akin to veridical hallucination. The brain in the vat perceive objects to 
be absent which really are absent, hence such experiences are veridical. But the brain in the 
vat’s absence experiences fail to involve the world itself in the relevant way that should cause us 
concern. For instance, qua brain in a vat, it fails to be in perceptual contact with the region of 
space between two teeth. This is the result we should want. 
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Granted, there may be other examples of tactual experiences which are explained by both the 
memory-perception mismatch model and the meta-cognitive theory.6 My claim is that there is at 
least one such example of a tactual experience, which, due to its being (i) expected, (ii) directed 
towards one’s own body and (iii) having certain duration and repeatability, which is not well 
explained by these theories.  
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